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1 Introduction
On the critical end, the annual Arab Human
Development Reports, launched in 2002 by the UN
Development Programme, have painted a picture
of stagnation, rapidly increasing poverty and
inequality, as well as gender gap and other
disparities. Alternatively, several countries in the
Arab Middle East and North Africa were also
described as success stories by multinational
institutions, including the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) who repeatedly praised
Tunisia and Egypt’s economic performance.1 Even
after the uprisings, a columnist in the New York
Times argued that economic success was behind
the revolution in Egypt, since it unleashed the
forces of an ‘entrepreneurial middle class’2 and
made Egypt ‘the eighteenth easiest nation in
which to start a business’ (Ayres and Macey
2011). The reality is that there is some truth to
both narratives, but that neither fully captures
the course of economic development in Arab
countries over the last 25 years. The explanation
for the uprisings is better found in the political
economy of regime consolidation than in
aggregate statistics, whether one glosses them
favourably or unfavourably. In addition, key policy
decisions taken in the early 2000s hastened the
demise of the Egyptian (and Tunisian) regimes –
and perhaps others to follow.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, several
countries in the Arab Middle East and North
Africa, including Egypt, had reached a difficult
impasse. On the one hand, their economies were
stagnating, and gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rates were in decline (Figure 1). They had
launched major programmes of economic
liberalisation in the late 1970s, 1980s or early
1990s, depending on the country. Despite the
results, the governments were under pressure
from emerging forces inside the regimes (as well
as from outside) to expand the programmes. As
late as 2004, the IMF was urging ‘significant
acceleration of the pace of structural adjustment’
in Egypt.3 On the other hand, this process had
undermined the autocratic model of power
consolidation that the regimes had spent years
refining, or perhaps in their minds, perfecting.
Egypt and some of the other regimes’ response
was twofold: first, it embarked upon further
liberalisation with the primary goal of attracting
foreign direct investment from Europe, North
America and China, including the signing of
bilateral free-trade agreements with the EU and
USA and a massive programme of privatisation.
Second, after the al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11, it
adopted the Bush administration’s framework of
a ‘global war on terror’, enabling them to
dedicate more resources to repression of
escalating dissent. These two choices, however,
further weakened the grip of the regime; the
first causing splits in the business elite and the
second alienating the educated middle-classes,
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with increasingly arbitrary state behaviour, lack
of rule of law and rising corruption. The regimes
were able to hang on for another decade, but it
was clear that they were living on borrowed time.
The ruling cliques of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and
Husni Mubarak were finished off by the
worldwide financial crisis beginning in 2008,
which led to declines in foreign direct investment
and a slowdown of economic growth (Brach and
Loewe 2010), when there were few if any social
forces to come to their defence (see below).
2 The rise and fall of the social contract
After independence in 1952, Egypt was a model
for the populous Arab countries in combining
authoritarian rule with a redistributive welfare
state served by a large bureaucracy. The state
owned industrial and other enterprises employing
an urban workforce that provided agricultural
support to the peasantry and supplied extensive
subsidies for basic consumer goods. This
corporatist model – called ‘authoritarian populist’
by political scientists – consolidated power by
trading development for the political loyalty of
key social forces, such as workers, peasants,
professionals and others in the educated middle-
class. Not all citizens accepted the tradeoff, of
course; many resisted and paid a hefty price.
Particularly in the early post-independence years,
however, the Arab regimes built their legitimacy
on aspirations for a developmental state.
The development outcomes in the Arab world
were substantial. The economists James E. Rauch
and Scott Kostyshak divide the region into three
categories: the Arab Mediterranean (Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia);
Arab sub-Saharan Africa, including Yemen; and
‘fuel-endowed countries’, encompassing Iraq and
the Gulf monarchies, as well as Algeria and
Libya (Rauch and Kostyshak 2009).
The focus in this article is on Egypt, classified as
part of the Arab Mediterranean. All the Arab
Mediterranean countries are middle-income
countries with similar economic structures and
economic trajectories to other post-colonial
middle-income countries (e.g. large peasant
sector alongside urbanisation and a
manufacturing-industrial sector; policy
sequencing of first substantial state-led
development followed by liberalisation).
However, Egypt had not gone through the wave
of democratisation. Also, unlike the pure
‘rentier-states’ in the region, they have
relatively little oil and natural gas endowments
and are thus more constrained in terms of
expenditures. These two characteristics
separate them from the remainder of the Arab
Middle East and North Africa, including
countries like Algeria – which otherwise had a
very similar trajectory – with a large carbon
endowment, and Yemen which has remained a
low-income economy with little to no
diversification of production structures. Taking
issue with the Arab Human Development Report’s
dismal prognosis, Rauch and Kostyshak argue
that most of these countries inherited abysmal
conditions from colonial times and have
nevertheless made dramatic progress.
Many Arab countries have increased both life
expectancy and rates of education by a greater
percentage than other developing regions, or
even the world, since 1970. For example, life
expectancy in the Arab Mediterranean countries
was 52 years in 1970 and 71.4 in 2007, an
increase of 19.4, while the comparable numbers
in Latin America were 60.4 and 73.1, an increase
of only 12.7 years. From 1970 to 2007, the
average number of years of education went up
from 1.4 to 5.5 in the Arab Mediterranean, an
increase of 4.1 years, whereas for Latin America,
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Figure 1 Egypt annual GDP growth rates, 1990–2009
Source World Development Indicators online database (data.worldbank.org).
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the number rose from 3.4 to 5.7, an increase of
2.3 years. In fact, the Arab Mediterranean
outperformed southern Europe and the rest of
the non-Arab world in both of those categories
over the same time period.
None of these regimes, however, were able to
build a truly developmentalist state.
Developmentalist states are able to use public
investment and state expenditure to create an
economy characterised by ‘a set of assets based
on knowledge, exploited by skilled labor’
(Amsden 2001) with ‘highly selective
meritocratic recruitment’ (Evans 1995). Key to
these efforts are the establishment of a non-
politicised bureaucracy that is able to enforce
accountability and quality control on the private
or mixed sector and technological upgrading that
allows industry to compete on international
markets. The post-independent Arab countries
were able to seize the commanding heights of
the economy. They raised protectionist tariffs,
expanded infrastructure and undertook huge
investments in human as well as physical capital
development, with success in simple
manufactures as well as more sophisticated and
heavy industry. In almost all cases however, the
development bureaucracy served primarily
political goals and therefore could not enforce
performance outcomes like its more technocratic
counterparts in the Asian tigers.
Starting in the mid-1970s in Egypt, the
authoritarian populist social contract began to
unravel; along with it, the impressive
developmental accomplishments began to stall
and, in some cases, retreat. GDP growth rates
that averaged around 6 per cent per year in the
1960s became less than 1 per cent in the 1980s.
Total factor productivity, which measures
contributions of human and physical capital,
which was a robust 3.4 per cent in the 1960s,
became –1.5 per cent in the 1980s and stagnated
throughout the 1990s (Yousef 2004). While the
Arab Middle East had one of the lowest incidences
of poverty and income inequality during the
1960s–early 1980s period, the Arab Human
Development Report (UNDP and AFESD 2002)
projected that about 40 per cent of Arabs,
approximately 65 million people, live in poverty.
New social forces, particularly the emerging
merchant-manufacturing class, increasingly
pushed for using the state as an instrument of
wealth accumulation rather than for
redistributive or productive investment purposes.
In many cases, these merchant-manufacturers
had enriched themselves through mere business
or kinship ties to the ruling apparatus. They
exploited this proximity to become even richer in
the era of structural adjustment. When some of
the regimes ran into macroeconomic problems
such as severe current account deficits or financial
crises, the IMF, World Bank and other institutions
reinforced the neoliberal message.
3 Fateful decisions
By the late 1990s, much of the region had gone
through two decades of structural adjustment
characterised by the trinity of economic
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation.
The economies of most countries, however, were
not growing as rapidly as hoped.
Figure 1 shows the yearly rates of GDP growth
per capita in Egypt from 1990 to 2009. The data
shows on average, a growth rate through the
early 1990s, then a decline by the first few years
of the new millennium, followed by a rise in the
mid-2000s until the worldwide financial crisis hit
with full impact in 2008. The rise of GDP growth
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Figure 2 Egypt foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), 1990–2009
Source World Development Indicators online database (data.worldbank.org).
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rates in the mid-2000s, however, hides the
mechanism through which they were achieved: a
policy decision to open the floodgates to private
capital, foreign and domestic, and therefore
make growth dependent on flows of foreign and
domestic investment.
Figure 2 illustrates this finding more clearly. As a
percentage of GDP, net inflows of foreign direct
investment increased dramatically in Egypt.
Figures 3 and 4 repeat the same exercise for the
rest of the Arab Mediterranean (excluding
Lebanon) to show that there were similar
processes taking place. Both graphs show an
upward trend, but in the 2000s there is an
obvious quantitative increase – in some cases
quite dramatic – across the Arab Mediterranean.
GDP growth rates and inflows of investment
dollars jumped at the beginning of 2004, after
the ‘reform government’ of Ahmad Nazif took
power in Egypt. In particular, the pace of
privatisation of state-owned enterprises picked
up, after a slowdown around the turn of the
millennium (Figure 5), as more companies were
sold off in full or in part. Markets were ecstatic
at this turn of events. ‘If privatisation was the
test, then [the Nazif] government has proved its
mettle’, gushed one investor newsletter. ‘Investor
confidence in the country has skyrocketed. The
future looks bright for Egypt’ (Emerging Markets
Monitor 2005). The Hermes stock index raced
upward.
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Figure 4 Arab Mediterranean foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), 1990–2009
Source World Development Indicators online database (data.worldbank.org).
Figure 3 GDP growth rates in the Arab Mediterranean, 1990–2009
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Source World Development Indicators online database (data.worldbank.org).
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The Nazif government solved one problem while
creating others, however. Arguably, it caused
irreversible damage to the remaining political
base of the regime. While the newer capitalists
close to the regimes were beneficiaries, the
dramatic opening angered many of the business
elite who still had vested interests in a
semblance of a national market. Signs of these
conflicts can be traced through anxiety in the
business press. As early as September of 2007,
the Emerging Markets Monitor had identified
growing worker strikes and sit-ins as a threat to
the campaign of privatisation. More importantly,
it identified the campaign, ‘No To Selling Egypt’,
launched by a former state-owned enterprise
manager, as gaining traction in the Egyptian
parliament. This campaign was not merely by
‘leftist opposition’, as the Monitor’s release stated.
And the opposition is not just coming from the
public. The No To Selling Egypt campaign run
by Yehia Hussein Abdel Hady is gaining
traction within parliament, with the support
of the handful of leftist opposition ministers of
parliament as well as the Muslim Brotherhood.
Interestingly, the official policy of this latter
group, the most popular opposition force, is
not necessarily informed by the populist view:
‘We are for privatisation provided that the
assets of the companies to be sold receive a
fair valuation’, said the group’s economic
adviser, Abdel-Hamid al-Ghazali. However, in
practice it seems that its members are
supporting Abdel Hady’s campaign, which is
based around the argument that the
government has undersold Egyptian assets.
(Emerging Markets Monitor 2007)
By 2010, the divisions over the economic
programme had spread into the upper echelons
of the policy elite. The Monitor’s January 2011
political and economic outlook report identified
this split as tied to Gamal Mubarak’s succession,
but that it was signified through opposition to
economic reforms. Although they reassured
investors that ‘a massive uprising in popular
discontent remains outside our core scenario’,
they nevertheless added that:
More important to watch will be any shift in
relative power dynamics among the ‘old’ and
‘new’ guard factions within the NDP [National
Democratic Party], particularly as this might
provide an indication into the future
presidential succession question. As recent
reports have indicated that the older
entrenched elites (represented by individuals
such as Secretary General Safwat al-Sharif
and Presidential Chief of Staff Zakaria Azmi)
have been able to exert greater influence on
internal party dynamics of late, any increase
in their support base could signal their further
consolidation of power. Given this group’s
broad opposition to President Mubarak’s son,
Gamal, taking over power after his father, we
would take any power shift in their direction
as the end of the younger Mubarak’s
presidential bid. For foreign investors, we
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Figure 5 Egypt state-owned enterprises totally or partially privatised, 1993–2006 
Source Omran (2007) and Emerging Markets Monitor (2007).
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stress that given this faction’s resistance to
the series of economic reforms that have been
pushed through since 2004, we would take any
further consolidation of power in their
direction over the next few months as an
indication that little should be expected out of
the government in terms of further economic
reforms, at least in the near term. 
(Emerging Markets Monitor 2011)
Meanwhile, structural adjustment in the 1980s
and 1990s had seen Egypt largely abandon its
legacy of support for workers and peasants. The
very language of ‘peasants and workers’, once a
prominent prop of the authoritarian populist
model of rule, disappeared from the lexicon of
regimes, unable or unwilling to abide by the social
contract. Alongside the shifts in policy and
rhetoric, uprisings based on economic (and
political) grievances erupted across the region:
Egypt in 1977; Morocco in 1981 and 1984; Tunisia
in 1985; Algeria in 1988 and Jordan in 1989. The
increase in global food prices since 2007
contributed to another wave of such ‘bread riots’
in several countries, including Mauritania and
Morocco, lasting up to the outbreak of the
Tunisian revolution. In Egypt, some 1.7 million
workers took part in over 1,900 strikes between
2004 and 2008, before the financial crisis, when
the number of strikes and work stoppages reached
into the thousands (Solidarity Center 2009). The
labouring classes were reacting in fury, not only to
their higher cost of living, but also to the mounting
extravagance and conspicuous consumption of the
elite (see Ali, this IDS Bulletin).
4 Pyrrhic victories
The second fateful decision came shortly after
9/11, when Washington’s newly aggressive neo-
conservative orientation presented both a threat
and an opportunity. Having launched one war in
Afghanistan and telegraphed another in Iraq,
the Bush administration constrained the ability
of regional allies to pursue independent foreign
policies. On the other hand, the Arab regimes
quickly learned that by casting their internal
enemies as those of the USA as well, they could
attract more resources to dedicate to repression.
Many of the regimes projected the image of
‘liberalised autocracy’ by making and reversing
concessions depending on the degree of internal
and external pressure. Pleasing the West took
the additional form of what can only be described
as public relations campaigns, as regimes (and
first ladies) spoke the language of civil society,
anti-extremism and modernisation; all winks at
the liberal sensibility.
Coupled with the heightened belligerence of the
security services, the policy decisions of the
political elite were clearly losing friends for the
regimes. Even segments of the professional and
managerial class that hitherto had been explicitly
non-political began to chafe at the outlandish
behaviour of the secret police in particular (see
Tadros, this IDS Bulletin). The politically minded
among the educated middle-classes were struck
with an iron fist (see Ali, El Naggar, Ezbawy, Abd
el Wahab, this IDS Bulletin). By the late 2000s,
the Arab states had become virtual oligarchies
with an isolated and hated ruling elite.
Understanding the political economy of regime
consolidation helps one to understand the Arab
revolts better than a simple focus on deprivation
or economic success. In a way, the regimes
succeeded in solving their immediate problems.
They were accepted by the West as partners, and
cast their domestic cruelty as an honourable
fight against terrorism. They managed to bolster
the rates of economic growth, in some cases
quite significantly. But these victories proved to
be pyrrhic, as the regimes also succeeded in
alienating whatever social base they had left.
Perhaps it would have been possible for the
regimes to make other decisions, for instance, to
engage in meaningful political reform and relax
emergency law. They could have re-thought the
model of economic development and attempted
to rewrite an inclusive social contract with
workers and peasants. They did not, and perhaps
could not, do so. It is clear, however, that the
reforms they tried to initiate after the uprisings
broke out, came almost a decade too late.
The Egyptian and Arab revolts have occurred
within a global context that is witnessing a
general crisis of capitalism. Although the
persistence of authoritarianism had been unique
to the Arab world, the economic policies they
employed were not. The USA has suffered the
results of financialisation and structural
adjustment policies have now reached the First
World, with countries like Greece and Italy being
subjected to harsh conditionalities and IMF
monitoring. Needless to say, this current period is
an opportunity to think and implement different
approaches to economic development away from
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unfettered free markets, trade and financial
flows. However, the experience of the Arab
Middle Eastern economies provides global lessons
for development that should be kept in mind
when alternative approaches to development are
discussed. First, the experience of the successful
developmentalist countries shows that there
should be an expanded role for the state in the
economy, including active industrial policy
(Chang and Grabel 2004; Amsden 2001).
However, the trajectory of the Arab states
indicates that the lack of democracy in the Arab
world did hurt economic development. The
authoritarian regimes inhibited the
establishment of horizontal (governmental
checks and balances; independent judiciary) and
vertical (media and popular pressure from below)
accountability mechanisms (Mainwaring and
Welna 2003), which would strengthen domestic
institutions. This is now seen as the main
indicator for successful economic growth (Rodrik
2007). Therefore, the path towards achieving
effective human development in the Arab world
and beyond must take into account strengthening
democratic institutions as well as addressing
social justice and economic growth.
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Notes
* This article is adapted from a version that
first appeared in the Middle East Report 259,
Summer 2011.
1 Source: www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/
201009017095/Economics/imf-praises-
tunisias-economic-policies-and-reforms.html
2 Source: www.freakonomicsmedia.com/2011/
02/22/memo-to-syria
3 Source: www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2004/
pr04227.htm
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